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Abstract
Waiting for rewards is difficult, and highly impulsive individuals with low self-control have an especially hard time
with it. Here, we investigated whether neural responses to rewards in a delayed gratification task predict impulsivity
and self-control. The EEG was recorded from participants engaged in a guessing game in which on each trial they
could win either a large or small reward, paid either now or after 6 months. Ratings confirmed that participants
preferred immediate, large rewards over small, delayed rewards. Electrophysiological reward signals reflecting the
difference between immediate and future rewards predicted self-report measures of impulsivity and self-control.
Further, these signals were highly reliable across two sessions over a 1-week interval, showing high temporal stability
like stable personality traits. These results suggest that greater valuation of immediate rewards causes impulsive
individuals to redirect control away from delayed rewards, indicating why it is so hard for them to wait.
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Difficulty with resisting temptation—such as snacking while on a
diet, playing a video game when one should be studying, or sleep-
ing late instead of exercising—is a hallmark of human fallibility.
All of these instances pit a choice between an immediately reward-
ing outcome (in these examples, food, fun, and sleep) against a
delayed and often more abstract outcome (losing weight, perform-
ing well on an exam, and staying healthy). Walter Mischel and
colleagues’ seminal marshmallow experiment precipitated a surge
of research interest on the ability to wait for delayed rewards
(Mischel, Shoda, & Peake, 1988). In that study, preschool-age chil-
dren were required to decide between eating a single marshmallow
right away or waiting about 15 min for an additional marshmallow.
Ten years later, the researchers contacted the children’s caregivers
and found that the ability at age 4 to wait for the second marshmal-
low predicted traits related to impulsivity and self-control at age
14. Strikingly, these correlations between performance in the
marshmallow task and behavioral measures of impulsivity and self-
control were found to persist even 40 years after the initial test
(Casey et al., 2011).
Obviously, the ability to wait for a delayed reward reflects a sta-
ble trait. But what neurocognitive mechanisms underlie it? This
topic has been intensively studied in recent years. At a cognitive
level, Mischel and colleagues argued that the ability to wait for
reward is associated with attentional control and self-regulation
(Mischel et al., 1988). They found that children who shifted their
attention away from the marshmallow or who utilized task strate-
gies that reduced its perceived reward value (like imagining the
marshmallow to be an abstract object made of cotton) were better
able to wait for the second reward (Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez,
1989). Later, Baumeister and colleagues proposed that self-control
over impulsive behavior draws on a limited resource, such that the
moment-to-moment exercise of control increases the probability of
impulsive behavior in the immediate future (Baumeister, Vohns, &
Tice, 2007). While the self-control concept of Baumeister and col-
leagues is more statelike, there are also more traitlike views of self-
control. It has been shown, for example, that people who abuse
addictive substances show deficits in the ability to delay gratifica-
tions (Kirby, Petry, & Bickel, 1999; Petry, 2001). The reason for
this finding may be that drug-abusing people are more impulsive
and show lower self-control.
With respect to the neural mechanisms underlying this ability,
Gianotti, Figner, Ebstein, and Knoch (2011) found that lower levels
of baseline activity in the high-beta frequency band of the EEG
predicted the degree to which individuals devalued future rewards.
By means of source localization, this effect was associated with the
left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, a brain area important in self-
control. McClure and colleagues found that limbic brain areas were
sensitive to immediate rewards, whereas the lateral prefrontal cor-
tex was associated with the ability to delay gratification (McClure,
Ericson, Laibson, Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2007; McClure, Laibson,
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Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2004). Further, Ballard and Knutson
(2009) found that the prefrontal cortex is involved in discounting
the value of delayed rewards, with regions responding specifically
to reward magnitude and delay. Also, Figner and colleagues
(2010) observed that disruption to the activity of left lateral pre-
frontal cortex using repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation
biased participants to choose relatively immediate rewards over
larger delayed rewards. These and further studies indicate that
prefrontal brain structures play a central role in self-control over
impulsive behaviors, as reflected in the ability to defer immediate
gratification for a delayed but ultimately more valuable outcome
(Kim & Lee, 2011).
The anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), a wide expanse of neural
territory along the frontal midline, is also involved in cognitive
control. It has been proposed that ACC is responsible for support-
ing control over extended, goal-directed behaviors (Holroyd &
Yeung, 2012), especially for tasks that entail high effortful costs
(Holroyd & McClure, 2015). With this view, the ACC would
ensure that an elite marathon runner win a race rather than linger at
the first water station along the way. The theory thus suggests a
strong connection between the control and reward-processing func-
tions of the ACC and the neurocognitive mechanisms that support
delayed gratification. Insight into the reward processing function of
ACC is provided by a component of the ERP, called the reward
positivity (cf. Miltner, Braun, & Coles, 1997), which is proposed to
reflect the impact of dopamine reward signals on the ACC (Hol-
royd & Coles, 2002; Holroyd, Pakzad-Vaezi, & Krigolson, 2008).
Simultaneous recordings of EEG and fMRI data indicate that
reward positivity amplitude is positively correlated with the blood-
oxygen level dependent response in ventral striatum (Becker,
Nitsch, Miltner, & Straube, 2014; Carlson, Foti, Mujica-Parodi,
Harmon-Jones, & Hajcak, 2011), reflecting a strong association
with mesolimbic reward processing. Reward positivity amplitude is
also associated with individual difference in reward sensitivity
(e.g., Bress & Hajcak, 2013; Foti & Hajcak, 2009) and shows high
test-retest reliability, indicating that it reflects a stable personality
trait (Proudfit, 2015). Further, in line with the observation of great-
er ACC activation for choices between immediate versus delayed
rewards (McClure et al., 2007), a recent study found that immedi-
ate rewards in a reward discounting task elicit larger reward posi-
tivity amplitudes in high temporal discounters compared to low
temporal discounters (Cherniawsky & Holroyd, 2013).
These considerations suggest that individual differences in
ACC sensitivity to immediate versus delayed rewards may predict
individual differences in the ability to delay gratification. Here, we
investigated this question by asking participants to complete ques-
tionnaires that assess personality traits related to impulsivity and
self-control, and then recording their EEG as they performed a
delayed gratification task. On each trial of the task, participants
won either a small or large reward that was given to them either at
the end of the experiment or after 6 months. We predicted that rela-
tively impulsive people with low self-control would be hypersensi-
tive to the differences between immediate and delayed rewards. In
particular, we predicted that reward positivity amplitude would
reflect a greater perceived difference between immediate rewards
and delayed rewards in high impulsive individuals with low self-
control compared to low impulsive individuals with high self-
control. We also predicted that reward positivity amplitude would
be stable within individuals when assessed on two occasions sepa-
rated by about 1 week, as it should be if it reflects a personality
trait.
Method
Participants
Data were collected from 20 participants (10 female) whose mean
age was 27.6 years (range 20–56 years) and who were recruited via
a local homepage in W€urzburg, Germany. They came to the labora-
tory for two sessions, separated by about 1 week. All but one were
college-educated or had already completed a graduate degree. Par-
ticipants were paid in the two delayed gratification tasks as
described below. On average, they received 6.8 euros in cash
immediately upon completing the experiment and 6.9 euros trans-
ferred to their bank accounts 6 months later. As the participants
also performed several additional tasks with monetary rewards that
are not reported here, they earned on average 23.5 euros for their
participation. The study was carried out in accordance with the
Declaration of Helsinki and was approved by the local university
ethics committee.
Apparatus
The experimental tasks were programmed and presented in Psy-
choPy (Peirce, 2008). Statistical analyses were computed with R
(R Development Core Team, 2015).
Procedure
Participants read a written instruction and signed an informed con-
sent statement at the beginning of the experiment. Then, an elec-
trode cap for recording the EEG was placed on the participant’s
head. They were seated in a dimly lit room on a comfortable chair,
approximately 100 cm in front of a computer monitor. Participants
came to the lab twice. Both sessions were separated by about 1
week and took place at the same time of day to control for diurnal
influences. Participants also completed other decision-making tasks
that are reported elsewhere.
Delayed gratification task. The delayed gratification task con-
sisted of 125 experimental trials and one test trial in each of the
two sessions. At the beginning of each trial, a fixation dot was pre-
sented for a random interval between 300–700 ms (Figure 1). Sub-
sequently, an image representing the backs of four “cards” was
presented. On each trial, participants chose one of the four card
locations by pressing one of four corresponding buttons. They were
instructed beforehand that each card choice would result in one of
four possible outcomes, as indicated by one of two symbols pre-
sented on a contrasting background: 10 cents (diamond) or 1 cent
(square) received either at the end of the experiment (white back-
ground) or after 6 months (black background). Prior to the start of
the task, they learned that diamond and square indicated a positive
and a negative outcome, respectively. After a random interval
between 300–700 ms following the response, the outcome of the
selected card was shown together with the elaboration “You win
now/in 6 months 10/1 cent!” (in German) as appropriate to the out-
come. This feedback was displayed for 1,500 ms. All stimuli in the
delayed gratification task occupied about 68 of visual angle hori-
zontally and 48 vertically. Participants received each of the four
outcomes 30 times in a pseudorandomized order. Five additional
trials were added to ensure that participants received different
amounts of money across the two experimental sessions. A feed-
back stimulus presented at the end of the task indicated how much
money in total the participant would receive immediately and in 6
months.
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Ratings and questionnaires. After completing the delayed grati-
fication task, participants rated each outcome according to its
valence and arousal on a 9-point rating scale with high values indi-
cating positive valence and high arousal. Further, at the completion
of the first session of the experiment, they also completed the Ger-
man version (Keye, Wilhelm, & Oberauer, 2009) of the UPPS
Impulsive Behavior Scale (Whiteside, & Lynam, 2001), which
assesses four facets of impulsivity—urgency, (lack of) premedita-
tion, (lack of) perseverance, and sensation seeking—and a brief
German version (Bertrams & Dickh€auser, 2009) of the Self-
Control Scale (Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004).
EEG Recording and ERP Quantification
The EEG was recorded from 31 Ag/AgCl scalp electrodes placed
on each participant’s head according to the 10-20 system (Fp1,
Fp2, F9, F7, F3, Fz, F4, F8, F10, FC5, FC1, FCz, FC2, FC6, T7,
C3, C4, T8, TP9, CP1, CP2, TP10, P7, P3, Pz, P4, P8, PO9, O1,
O2, PO10) and one Ag/AgCl electrode placed under the left eye,
using a BrainAmp DC amplifier (Brain Products GmbH, Gilching,
Germany). Impedances were below 10 kX, and electrode record-
ings were referenced to the vertex (Cz). The data were analog
band-pass filtered during recording from 0.016 Hz to 80 Hz and
sampled at 250 Hz. For offline data processing, EEGLAB
(Delorme & Makeig, 2004) running under the MATLAB environ-
ment (The MathWorks, Inc.) was used.
EEG artifacts were corrected using independent component
analysis as proposed by Debener, Thorne, Schneider, and Viola
(2010). Eye-related artifact components and heartbeat artifact com-
ponents were removed by back projection of all remaining compo-
nents. The artifact-corrected data were then rereferenced to the
mean of the voltages recorded at electrode locations TP9 and
TP10. For ERP analysis, the data were band-pass filtered between
0.2 Hz and 20 Hz, segmented into epochs from 2200 ms to 800
ms around reward feedback onset, and baseline-corrected (2200
ms to 0 ms). Epochs with residual artifacts were removed. To iden-
tify the time window for evaluating the reward positivity, we first
computed grand-averaged feedback-locked ERPs. We selected the
interval between 280 and 388 ms postfeedback, corresponding to
the period extending between the P2 deflection and the P3 deflec-
tion, in order to capture the period of the N200, when the reward
positivity normally occurs (Holroyd et al., 2008). This interval is
similar to the time interval suggested by Sambrook and Goslin
(2015), who, based on a meta-analysis of published waveforms,
suggested that the reward positivity should be evaluated during the
period from 240 to 340 ms postfeedback. Note that this time win-
dow was determined based on the grand-averaged ERPs across all
of the participants, as opposed to assessing separate time windows
for the low impulsive/high self-control and high impulsive/low
self-control participants. Reward positivity amplitude, averaged
within this time window, was assessed at electrode FCz, where it
reached maximum amplitude in agreement with the literature
(Miltner et al., 1997; Proudfit, 2015). Following common practice,
reward positivity amplitude was evaluated with a difference wave
approach, which isolates variance in the ERP associated with
reward trials while attenuating confounding ERP components such
as the P300 (Holroyd & Krigolson, 2007; Sambrook & Goslin,
2015). The computation of difference waves is generally recom-
mended by Luck (2005) and especially concerning the reward posi-
tivity by Proudfit (2015). In order to dissociate the influences of
delay and reward magnitude on ERP amplitudes, we computed two
difference waves. For the delay reward positivity, we averaged
across reward magnitude and computed a difference wave between
the ERPs to later and immediate rewards. For the magnitude
reward positivity, we averaged across delay and computed a differ-
ence wave between the ERPs to small and large rewards. Note that
larger reward positivities are indicated by more negative ampli-
tudes, following the convention.
Figure 1. Task design. Four possible outcomes in the delayed gratification task (upper) and a schematic illustrating the time course of one trial of the
task (lower).
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Results
Delayed Gratification Task
We analyzed participants’ card choices depending on the outcome
of the previous trial. Participants could either choose the same card
location again or switch to another card location. An analysis of
variance (ANOVA) on participants’ choice behavior with reward
magnitude of the previous outcome (10 cents or 1 cent) and delay
of the previous outcome (now or later) as within-subject factors
revealed a significant main effect of reward magnitude on partici-
pants’ card choice, F(1,19)5 9.86, p5 .005. Following 10 cent
rewards, participants preferred the same card location on 47% of
trials whereas following 1 cent rewards, they chose the same card
location in only 36% of trials (Figure 2, left panel). There was no
significant main effect of delay (p5 .2) and no significant interac-
tion between magnitude and delay (p5 .6).
Figure 2 (middle panel) illustrates that participants felt best after
the best outcome (10 cents now) and worst after the worst outcome
(1 cent later). A corresponding ANOVA on valence ratings
revealed main effects of reward magnitude, F(1,19)5 64.14,
p< .001, and delay, F(1,19)5 8.49, p5 .009, as well as their inter-
action, F(1,19)5 9.19, p5 .007. All pairwise comparisons between
the four possible outcomes revealed that participants rated the out-
come of 10 cents now as most positive and 1 cent later as least pos-
itive (all ps< .01), except for the outcomes of 1 cent now and 1
cent later, which were rated as about equally positive (p5 .4). Fur-
ther, an ANOVA on arousal ratings revealed significant main
effects of reward magnitude, F(1,19)5 18.63, p< .001, and delay,
F(1,19)5 12.19, p5 .002, but no interaction between the two fac-
tors (p5 .1). Pairwise comparisons between all four possible out-
comes confirm that participants felt most aroused after the best
outcome of 10 cents now and least aroused after the worst outcome
of 1 cent later (all ps< .05; Figure 2, right panel). Subsequent cor-
relation analyses between impulsivity and self-control scores ver-
sus switching behavior, valence, and arousal ratings were all
nonsignificant (all ps> .1).
Impulsivity/Self-Control and ERPs
We combined the impulsivity and self-control scores into a single
measure. To do so, we conducted a principal component analysis on
the impulsivity and self-control scores and extracted the first factor,
which explained 86% of the total variance. We then categorized the
participants into two groups based on a median split of this measure,
with 10 participants in a low impulsive/high self-control group and
10 participants in a high impulsive/low self-control group.
We first assessed the impact of each outcome on the raw ERP
values averaged across the time period associated with the reward
positivity (Figure 3). A three-factor ANOVA on the ERP ampli-
tudes with delay (now/later) and reward magnitude (10/1 cent) as
within-subject factors and impulsivity/self-control group as
between-subjects factor revealed a significant main effect of delay,
Figure 2. Behavioral data. Left: Participants were more likely to draw from the same card location after large rewards, irrespective of delay, than after
small rewards. Valence (middle) and arousal (right) ratings show that participants rated 10 cents now as the best and most arousing outcome and 1
cent later as the worst and least arousing outcome. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 3. ERPs for all four possible outcomes, time-locked to the
reward feedback. Data were recorded at channel FCz. Negative is plot-
ted up by convention.
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F(1,18)5 8.30, p5 .01, indicating that the ERPs were more posi-
tive for immediate rewards (3.6 mV) than for delayed rewards (2.2
mV), and a significant main effect of reward magnitude,
F(1,18)5 6.84, p5 .02, indicating that the ERPs were more posi-
tive for large rewards (3.5 mV) than for small rewards (2.3 mV).
Participants in the high impulsive/low self-control group showed
higher amplitudes (4.8 mV) than the low impulsive/high self-
control group (1.0 mV), as revealed by a significant effect of impul-
sivity/self-control group, F(1,18)5 6.14, p5 .02. In addition, the
interaction between delay and impulsivity/self-control group was
significant, F(1,18)5 4.47, p5 .05. These results show that better
outcomes elicited more positive-going ERPs in the time range of
the reward positivity. All other effects and interactions did not
reach significance (all ps> .1).
Reward Positivity
The remainder of our analysis focuses on the reward positivity,
from which confounding ERP components were removed by taking
the difference between the raw ERPs to positive and negative out-
comes (Holroyd & Krigolson, 2007; Miltner et al., 1997; Sambrook
& Goslin, 2015). As described in Method, we computed two
reward positivities to dissociate the influences of delay and reward
magnitude. The delay reward positivity showed high retest-
reliability over two sessions separated by about 1 week (r5 .72,
p< .001), whereas the magnitude reward positivity showed a lower
but still acceptable retest-reliability (r5 .48, p5 .03).
In order to determine whether sensitivity to reward delay or
reward magnitude in this task better explains individual
differences in impulsivity and self-control, we conducted a mul-
tiple regression analysis with the reward positivity amplitudes to
reward delay and reward magnitude as predictors and the com-
bined impulsivity/self-control measure as the outcome variable.
Reward positivity amplitude to delay and to reward magnitude
were not interrelated (p> .2), so both measures were included in
the multiple regression analysis as independent predictors. This
analysis revealed that reward positivity amplitude to reward
delay predicted impulsivity/self-control significantly (p5 .008),
whereas reward positivity amplitudes to reward magnitude did
not (p> .3). Therefore, in what follows, we focus our analysis
on the delay reward positivity.
Figure 4 shows the delay reward positivity (black), and the
associated raw ERPs to immediate (green) and delayed
(red) rewards for the 10 participants in the low impulsive/high
self-control group and the 10 participants in the high impul-
sive/low self-control group. Participants in the high impulsive/
low self-control group showed greater ERP differences
between immediate and delayed outcomes compared to the low
impulsive/high self-control group. This pattern was confirmed
by a statistically significant correlation between the combined
impulsivity/self-control measure and the delay reward positivi-
ty amplitude, r5 .63, p5 .003, r25 .39 (Figure 5), where more
negative amplitudes indicate larger reward positivity ampli-
tudes and more negative scores indicate higher impulsivity and
lower self-control. The results indicate that participants who
rated themselves as more impulsive and less self-controlled
showed bigger ERP differences between immediate and
delayed rewards (Figure 4,5).
Figure 4. Delay reward positivity with associated ERPs averaged over reward magnitude. High impulsive participants with low self-control showed
higher delay reward positivity amplitudes (black lines) compared to low impulsive participants with high self-control. Data recorded at channel FCz.
Negative is plotted up by convention.
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Discussion
The neurocognitive mechanisms that underlie the ability to defer
immediate gratification have been the subject of intensive research
in recent years. We predicted that ACC function, which is involved
in motivating the execution of extended behaviors (Holroyd &
McClure, 2015; Holroyd & Yeung, 2012), would contribute to the
expression of personality traits associated with this ability. To
investigate this question, we examined the reward positivity, an
ERP component said to reflect the impact of dopamine-dependent
reward signals on ACC (Holroyd & Coles, 2002) of participants as
they played a guessing task. On each trial, the participants won
either a large or small reward to be delivered either at the end of
the experiment or after a delay of 6 months. They were also asked
later to complete personality questionnaires assessing impulsivity
and self-control. We found that highly impulsive individuals with
lower self-control produced larger reward positivity amplitudes to
the difference between immediate and delayed rewards. Given that
the reward positivity appears to be produced in ACC (Holroyd &
Umemoto, 2016), our results suggest that the difference in ACC
activity between immediate and delayed rewards is strongly associ-
ated with personality traits related to impulsivity and self-control.
These findings dovetail with previous observations that suggest
that ACC supports the ability to delay gratification (Cherniawsky
& Holroyd, 2013; McClure et al., 2007).
This finding is especially important as Hajcak and other
researchers have focused on the reward positivity within the
Research Domain Criteria Framework (RDoC). The RDoC
approach looks for neurophysiological constructs that are expressed
dimensionally across the population, the extreme expression of
which can give rise to symptoms that cut across multiple different
disorders. As Proudfit (2015) has observed, low reward positivity
amplitude is related to depression, but not anxiety. Further, Hol-
royd and Umemoto (2016) have argued that ACC function under-
lies a construct related to the motivation of extended behaviors,
which can be observed as individual differences in reward sensitiv-
ity and persistence. Thus, past research strongly suggests a link
between the reward positivity and traits like impulsivity and self-
control. Our study shows exactly this association.
Importantly, we also found that reward positivity amplitude was
highly reliable when assessed across two experimental sessions
separated by about 1 week, replicating previous findings (Proudfit,
2015). These results align with a recent proposal that ACC supports
a neurocognitive function underlying a core dimension of personal-
ity, the extreme expression of which contributes to a diverse array
of mental disorders (Holroyd & Umemoto, 2016). Low reward pos-
itivity amplitude to small monetary rewards is associated with
reduced reward responsiveness (Proudfit, 2015) and increased lev-
els of depression (Proudfit, 2015) and substance dependence
(Baker, Stockwell, Barnes, & Holroyd, 2011). Conversely, high
reward positivity amplitude to monetary rewards is associated with
high reward discounting (Cherniawsky & Holroyd, 2013) and prob-
lem gambling (Hewig et al., 2010). These results appear to reflect
the motivational value of specific reinforcers to particular individu-
als. For example, for children with attention deficit hyperactivity
disorder, the reward positivity is larger to feedback indicating mon-
etary rewards than to feedback indicating that performance was
correct or incorrect (Holroyd et al., 2008; Umemoto, Lukie, Kerns,
M€uller, & Holroyd, 2014). Likewise, smokers produce larger
reward positivity amplitudes to feedback indicating cigarette puffs
compared to feedback indicating monetary rewards (Baker, Wood,
& Holroyd, 2016). In line with these findings, we found that the
participants who produced larger reward positivity amplitudes to
immediate versus delayed rewards also scored higher on impulsivi-
ty and lower on self-control.
A recent study observed that experimentally induced reductions
in cognitive control heighten the activity of two key neural areas
involved in reward valuation, orbitofrontal cortex and the ventral
striatum, thereby potentiating impulsive behaviors (Wagner, Alt-
man, Boswell, Kelley, & Heatherton, 2013). These brain areas are
proposed to compute the raw reward values that elicit the phasic
dopamine signals that, in turn, produce the reward positivity in
ACC (Holroyd & Yeung, 2012). Our results suggest that in impul-
sive individuals the ACC receives much larger reward signals for
immediate rewards relative to delayed rewards. As a consequence,
the ACC would be expected to release control over extended
behaviors directed toward the delayed rewards. In the context of
Mischel’s marshmallow task, when the ACC values the present
marshmallow more than the two forthcoming marshmallows, then
it withdraws control, permitting the child to eat the single marsh-
mallow impulsively. Of course, this particular decision would not
likely have a huge impact on the child (apart perhaps from a little
regret). But these same qualities could deter them from overcoming
larger challenges later in life, such as pursuing a college degree or
abstaining from addictive drugs (Kirby et al., 1999; Petry, 2001).
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